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The lack of collateralized trading in the OTC derivatives market and the absence of 
any system for the resolution of cross exposures have been highlighted as major 
causes of the collapse of assets prices during the financial crisis. According to the 
perfect market hypothesis derivatives are a zero sum game (according to Black-
Scholes pricing models) and do not add new risk to the market or modify existing 
risk. However, these virtues only apply in the real world in the presence of effective 
regulation, control, and supervision. The perverse effects of the financial crisis sug-
gest that it is time to rethink the standard finance theory approach to derivatives. 
 
 
Derivatives and the Finance Theory  
 
Finance theory relies heavily on the perfect market hypothesis which tells us that fi-
nancial derivatives are powerful tools for investors, banks, and governments to 
hedge, smooth financial costs, and create opportunities. According to the perfect 
market hypothesis derivatives are a zero sum game (according to Black-Scholes 
pricing models) and do not add new risk to the market or modify existing risk. How-
ever, these virtues only apply in the real world in the presence of effective regula-
tion, control, and supervision. 
The regulation of derivatives in the present global financial system is not homoge-
nous and the controls placed on investors vary across countries and investor clas-
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ses, leaving room for regulatory arbitrage. The most obvious example is the $67 tril-
lion of traditional securities and OTC derivatives traded in 2012 in the so-called 
shadow banking system, a system that operates with almost no supervision or moni-
toring. The lack of collateralized trading in the OTC derivatives market and the ab-
sence of any system for the resolution of cross exposures have been highlighted as 
major causes of the collapse of assets prices during the financial crisis. This real 
world experience suggests that it is time to rethink the standard finance theory ap-
proach to derivatives. 
 
The Subprime Crisis 
 
One of the initial shocks in the subprime crisis came when it was announced that it 
was impossible to value the off balance sheet assets and liabilities of a primary 
global bank.  This generated the panic in August 2007 and the crisis spread like a 
deadly plague. Investors could not be sure of the true market value of their assets 
and liabilities. Initial credit ratings were quickly discarded as they were no longer rel-
evant to the new market conditions of extreme liquidity shortage that was itself the 
result of the uncertainty on the value of assets pledged as collateral.  This uncertain-
ty depressed consumption and investment, and finally forced governments to inject 
resources to rescue banks and industries. The additional debt undertaken by gov-
ernments to prop up the collapse of equity in the private financial system led to sec-
ond crisis—the sovereign debt crisis. 
The subprime crisis revealed the systemic and perverse effects of improper risk 
management practices, weak regulation and supervision, and ineffective control due 
to the failure of regulators to comprehend the massive size of the shadow markets. 
The virtues attributed to derivatives by standard finance theory evaporated entirely 
during the crisis and these same virtues became vices that contributed substantial to 
systemic risk.  The roots of the subprime crisis thus may be seen to lie in dangerous 
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market imperfections and regulatory weaknesses. The appropriation of the profits of 
the finance industry by management and employees at the expense of shareholders 
and the economy as a whole has not been eliminated following the subprime crisis. 
Banks and investment firms still pay exorbitant bonuses to traders and brokers, 
while taxpayers and workers (employed and unemployed) pay the cost of the crisis 
(socialization of losses). 
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis and Options 
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky, 1977) provides a powerful alter-
native to standard Neo-Classical and New Keynesian models, which cannot provide 
a satisfactory integration of the real and the financial sides of macro-models. The 
FIH  also describes how financial markets become unstable even in the absence of 
an exogenous shock. The expansionary money policies of the new millennium, fi-
nancial globalization, and the enormous profits created in the derivatives market all 
fuelled the share of finance in GDP.  This process is endogenous to the capitalist 
economy, and the FIH captures these features. 
Financial innovation plays a key role in the growth of the capitalist economy. Finan-
cial innovation contributes to the endogenous creation of profits from new forms of 
investment during periods of tranquility and stability. However, according to the FIH, 
regulation and supervision should be used during turbulent periods to maintain a 
stable environment for investors and firms (see Oldani, 2008). Financial derivatives 
are the most developed financial innovation seen in recent decades; among these 
innovations, options represent an important share of the market.  According to fi-
nance and economic theory, options expand portfolio allocation opportunities, in-
crease market liquidity, and improve the pricing mechanism. When options are used 
for hedging, they contribute to better portfolio management for firms and investors. 
Options are introduced in the FIH by means of the hedging opportunities they pro-
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vide to firms, and thus influence the saving function and, as a result, the equilibrium. 
In the absence of shocks and with proper regulation and supervision, options con-
tribute to better portfolio management, as finance theory states. However, in the run-
up to the crisis, the benefits of this innovation led to a decline in the recognition of 
the important role of regulation in assuring these benefits. The failure of regulation 
led to the disappearance of the benefits of these instruments as a means to finance 
investment and promote growth. Instead innovative instruments were increasingly 
used for speculative financing of higher and high leverage positions. This was an 
endogenous process by which the belief in the benefits that could be derived from 
these instruments led to the elimination of the formal regulations and supervision 
that were necessary to achieve these benefits. 
When turbulence arose in these markets volatility increased, and the hedging strat-
egies of investors became ineffective, aggravating financial payments by firms. The 
leverage effect of options multiplies losses, which has a negative impact on the debt 
accumulation process and the investment decisions of firms. The reaction of firms 
can further intensify the downturn by selling assets, increasing the debt or trying to 
raise new capital.  In the presence of the massive use of options, financial fragility 
becomes more pronounced. Regulation is the tool needed to safeguard financial 
stability, as Minsky predicted at a time when financial markets were less sophisticat-
ed. During the crisis derivatives were like gasoline poured on a fire, but they were 
not the reason for the crash. Regulation of the global financial system was inappro-
priate; it allowed unregulated investors (like shadow banks) to expand their balance 
sheets without sufficient capitalization. 
The contribution of options to financial instability is similar to other financial securi-
ties previously investigated in the FIH literature in the presence of weak regulation 
and control, such as bonds and shares. They substantially worsen financial crises. 
An empirical investigation to measure the impact of derivatives on stability is not 
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possible, since data are not provided on a high frequency basis, and are not provid-
ed by the shadow banks that represent a large share of the market. 
The lack of data on the shadow banking system (trading, exposure, market concen-
tration counterpart and so on) and on OTC derivatives trading represents a clear ob-
stacle to a safe exit from the meltdown. Confidence in these markets cannot be re-
stored until specific responsibilities are defined and a strong regulatory response is 
put in place. 
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